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The Changing Face of German Jurisprudence after
1933 and post-1945
by Michael Stolleis*

I.

As long as there have been lawyers in any significant number in Central Europe-that is to say since about the 14th century-there has been criticism of them. There is a German saying "Juristen bose Christen" (Lawyers are wicked Christians).
It was first recorded around 1300.(1) Ever since, attitudes
towards this new administrative elite has oscillated between
respect and disdain, trust and distaste. There is a sense of
dependence, of needing them when disagreements turn into
lawsuits, and of having to pay dearly for their services. The
clergy, the nobility, peasants and bourgeoisie alike all had their
own problems with this new administrative elite, with the
increasing importance of legislation and the emphasis this
placed on the written word and professional training.
I have briefly alluded to this historical background because
it goes some way towards explaining the ambivalence with
which lawyers and jurists were treated under National
Socialism. In the Third Reich, too, lawyers were regarded as
hybrid creatures. The NSDAP saw the traditional civil service
* This is a revised version of a Fulton Lecture delivered at the Law School,
November 9, 2001; The Lecture was held to coincide with the annual
meeting of the American Society for Legal History.
1 Michael Stolleis, "Juristenbeschimpfung, oder: Juristen bose Christen,"
in: Theo Stammen, Heinrich Oberreuter, aa!;LP~lakli~~~.), PolitikBildung - Religion. Hans Maier zum 65. GebDtlt~ N&~nl1996, pp. 163170.
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system, dominated as it was by lawyers, as a reactionary force
that was an impediment to the Nazi movement. At the same
time, the Party was dependent on these structures at every
level, from the highest offices in the Reich to the regional and
municipal authorities. The many conflicts between the "state"
and the "movement" were, however, conflicts between
lawyers and non-lawyers. This is reflected in the gradual
removal of "jurists" (Hans Frank. Wilhelm Frick, Franz
Gurtner) while anti-judicial, power-hungry individuals asserted themselves (Himmler, Heydrich, Goebbels, Freisler,
Thierack).(2) Hitler, in his "Table-talk" conversations with his
henchmen at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, was dismissive and
aggressive in his remarks about lawyers. In the Reichstag in
1942, in a fit of rage, he made brutal threats against judges
whose rulings he considered too lenient. Thierack's commentaries on rulings, the so-called "Richterbriefe" or Judges'
Letters, followed-intended as both guidance and intimidation.(3)
The generally antagonistic attitude towards the judiciary
that prevailed among the leading figures of the Nazi regime,
the suppression of regular justice and administrative jurisdiction from the political arena, and, in particular, the infamous
Reichstag speech of 1942, fitted well with the lawyers' own
self-image. Indeed, it seemed heaven-sent, for it underpinned
their notion of a "suffering judiciary" and lent credence to the
idea of lawyers as the "most hated profession" in the Third
Reich, not to mention the violation of justice by a criminal
legislator.(4)
Lothar Gruchmann, Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933 - 1940: Anpassung und
Unterwerfung in der Ara Gurtner, Miinchen 1987.
3 Heinz Boberach (ed.), Richterbriefe: Dokumente zur Beeinflussung der
deutschen Rechtsprechung 1942 - 1944, Boppard 1975.
4 Hubert Schorn, Der Richter im Dritten Reich, Frankfurt 1959; Hermann
Weinkauff ans Albrecht Wagner, Die deutsche Justiz und der
2
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This self-image took hold and remained dominant for two
decades. It formed the basis of the Federal German legal system - a basis that was apparently necessary for re-stabilization. The conclusions drawn from it were the following:
After Germany's "Catastrophe" and "Zero Hour" a return
to Western values of idealism and natural law was seen as the
only possible path to take. Natural law alone seemed "to provide law with a backup against the pressure of political
power and naked violence." (5) This was favored by the fact
that in 1945, the churches, especially the less compromised
Catholic Church, were virtually the only major organizations
in a position to restore Germany's place in the civilized
world. "Legal positivism" -little more than a phantom of
legal theory-was regarded as outmoded.(6) This meant that
the polemical criticism of legal positivism that had prevailed
throughout the Weimar period and the Nazi period continued unabated. Only the anti-Jewish aspect of the arguments,
such as the attacks against Hans Kelsen, disappeared. It also
meant that general or blanket clauses found favor as points
where the new political order could revert to older law, precisely repeating the patterns of 1933-though this time
around it seemed excusable because the "contents" were now
right. And after all, the restitution of a neo-idealistic methodology was part and parcel of this internal reconstruction of
jurisprudence. (7)
Nationalsozialismus, Stuttgart 1968, Vol.l.
S Helmut Coing, Die obersten Grundsiitze des Rechts: Ein Versuch zur
Neubegriindung des Naturrechts, Heidelberg 1947, p. 7.
6 A well-balanced defender of legal positivism is W.Clever, "Zur
Nachkriegskritik des Rechtspositivismus," in: Deutsche Richter-Zeitung,
1949, p.348.
7 Christian Joerges, "Die Wissenschaft vom Privatrecht und der
Nationalstaat," in: Dieter Simon (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner
Republik: Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Jurisprudenz, Frankfurt
1994, pp. 311-363.
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In terms of constitutional theory, this approach was equivalent to establishing a "scale of values" that could be worn as
a protective shield in the Cold War, both at home and abroad.
It was developed from the text of the constitution and other
authoritative sources, almost as a kind of spiritual and intellectual substratum. In terms of method, this was undeniably
the heritage of the 1930s when not only Carl Schmitt propagated the distinction between (actual) constitution and (mere)
constitutional text, but when Rudolf Smend had also transcended positive constitutional law by emphasizing the spiritual and intellectual process of "integration". The "scale of
values" was the constitutional and methodological counterpart to the "liberal democratic basic order" (idGO) that was
imposed on the legal system. So much for the intellectual climate.(8) Very soon, the "scale of values" became a disciplinary tool.(9) Consider, for example, the Communist Party ban
pursued from 1951 onwards and finalized in 1956 with the
so-called KPD ruling that declared the party unconstitutional
(BVerfGE 5,85); or the political justice meted out to communists;(10) or the fundamental difficulties in defining "constitutional enemies" during the inner political unrest after 1968;
or the "Berufsverbot" debate about banning individuals with
certain political affiliations from occupations such as teaching
or civil service posts; or finally the debate about limitations
on freedom to demonstrate and the limitations of civil disobedience.

Erhard Denninger (ed.), Freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung,
Frankfurt 1977, 2 Parts.
9 Also Carl Schmitt saw this. Compare his contribution "Die Tyrannei der
Werte: Uberlegungen eines Juristen zur Wertphilosophie," in:
Siikularisation und Utopie: Ebracher Stlldien. Ernst Forsthoff zum 65.
Geburtstag, Stuttgart 1967, pp. 37-62.
10 Alexander v. Brunneck, Politische Justiz gegen Kommllnisten in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 - 1968, Frankfurt 1978, pp. 117 ff.
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In retrospect, we can recognize in the founding of the
Federal Republic a distinct pattern of defensive" common
values" in which the "others" were excluded by these values.
For German lawyers after 1945, who formed an even more
specific professional community of shared values, this meant
having to band together in order to gain a foothold and dispel the criticism leveled, for example, at their involvement in
National Socialism. Through tacit coalition and active association, virtually all the lawyers who had practiced in the Third
Reich were reinstated in public office and private law firms.
There were hardly any abrupt breaks or dismissals. Like the
rest of the nation, they were reluctant to look back into the
abyss.(ll) Only those considered to have gone beyond the
pale were excluded, but even that was not public knowledge.(12) In an essay published anonymously in November
1949, Carl Schmitt invoked a theme that typifies the spirit of
the time: "amnesty, the power of forgetting".
What this new departure meant was that Germany's recent
history under National Socialism could be disregarded or, at
most, remembered only as a time marred by a regrettable
perversion of justice. The legal authors of those years kept
silent about their earlier publications. Their pupils adjusted
the bibliographies. Librarians were instructed to sift out the
writings from the relevant period and stash it away in the
vaults. In fact, the Allies did the same in the immediate postwar period, and had lists drawn up by "untainted" specialists. So the process of "denazification", in this very broad

11 Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfiinge der Bundesrepublik und die
NS-Vergangenheit, Munchen 1996.
12 Michael Stolleis, "Die Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer:
Bemerkungen zu ihrer Geschichte," in: Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fur
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, 1997, pp. 339-358, concerning the
inner debates around the acceptance of former members of the NSDAP.
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sense, not only meant demotion or professional exclusion, but
was actually undertaken by the individuals themselves in a
bid to make their past disappear. In other words, it was a selfimposed damnatio memoriae. As such, it seemed only logical
that there were very few studies in legal history to address
the period before 1965 and that "contemporary legal history"
did not take shape as a discipline until much later.(13)
Younger scholars were taught that the time was not yet ripe
and, in addition, that nobody without first hand experience
of those days had any right to comment.
This broad consensus was rarely disturbed by dissonant
voices crying that it was not "legal positivism" that had been
the main problem - but a dearth of courage and a general
compliance on the part of the lawyers. Nor was the world of
lawyers caught up in National Socialism the non-political,
unsuspecting victim it was made out to be, but rather, it was
a politically conscious group whose nationalistic tendencies
were often perfectly in keeping with National Socialist
thought. After all, what was needed was not a return to natural law (which provided no practically feasible directives
anyway) but a move towards the "unfinished project of the
Enlightenment" -in other words, western constitutional and
legal ideas.
A glance at the Soviet zone of occupation and the emerging East German state of the GDR indicates that very similar
processes were at work there, although with a quite different
political content. A new world view was being established, a
kind of Socialist natural law, albeit under another name.(14)

13 Michael Stolleis (ed.), Juristische Zeitgeschichte - ein neues Fach?, BadenBaden 1993.
14 Robert Alexy, "Der Rechtsbegriff Walter Ulbrichts," in: Enquete-

Kommission Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in
Deutschland, Baden-Baden 1995, Vol.4, p.19.
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The same tendency towards polemical criticism of consistent
legal positivism (especially in the form given by Hans Kelsen)
could be found there, for this expressly politically neutral
legal theory could not be applied for their own purposes. It
served as the bogeyman of a bourgeois academic discipline
feigning objectivity as a mantle beneath which to pursue its
own class interests.(15) West and East, then, for all their political differences, were both" anti-positivist".
Admittedly, beyond this common denominator, there
were more differences than similarities. Under the rule of the
Soviet military administration, the new regime systematically destroyed the bourgeois state based on the rule of law.
The situation in Thuringia was to set the scene.(16) Staffing
policies were aimed at ousting conventional lawyers as
quickly as possible and replacing them with Party members
who had trained in special courses as People's Judges.(17)
This program was gradually extended from public prosecutors to judges, lawyers and university teaching staff, so that
by 1955 it was more or less fully in place. However, the most
important aim was the general elimination, or weakening, of
the rule of law as a means of control. It was one of the most
painful long-term experiences of East German lawyers that
they were never able to accept fully that the GDR government believed it could dispense with "law" in the sense of a
structured system of checks and balances and that it could
do without publicly debated textual criticism or commentaries-an attitude it had clearly held since the Babelsberg

15 Hermann Klenner, Rechtsleere: Verurteilung der Reinen Rechtslehre,
Frankfurt 1972.
16 Thomas Heil, Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Thiiringen 1945 - 1952,
Tiibingen 1996.
17 Julia Pfannkuch, Volksrichterausbildung in Sachsen 1945 - 1950, Frankfurt
1993.
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Conference of 1958.(18) It was only in the final decade of the
GDR that there appeared to be signs of a return towards
independent control of the administration, albeit with little
success.

II.
There is no simple way of summing up the shape of
jurisprudence after 1945. Almost all the colleagues driven into
exile by National Socialism were missing. Many others had
died or been murdered. With so few qualifying as professors
during the Nazi era, there was no broad-based, politically
untainted younger generation to take over the task of teaching and training. The core of the faculties that now began to
regroup was still formed by the same professors who had
taught at the universities from 1933 to 1945. A few of the
older generation who had gone into retirement in 1933 were
reinstated. And a few younger ones who had had no opportunity to advance under National Socialism, were added.
Almost all the "bourgeois" professors from the universities in
the Soviet zone came to the west. The" denazification" of professors was conducted along the same lines as happened with
any other administrative elites. Colleagues without a Nazi
past wrote dozens of certificates, known in Germany as
"Persil notes", attesting the recipient's conscience to be
"whiter-than-white."(19) Lengthy correspondences were conducted, old contacts revived, a helping hand was given to colleagues in the "eastern zone," and by 1950, almost all of them
were back at their old desks.
18 Jam Eckert (ed.), Die Babelsberger Konferenz vom 2./3. April 1958, BadenBaden 1993.
19 Collections of those "Persil-Notes" for example in the Archives of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Koblenz, in the papers of Walter Jellinek
and Friedrich Giese.
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Some of the more famous exceptions to this rule in the
field of public law should be mentioned. Carl Schmitt was
barred from holding any position of public importance, and
few doubted the justice of that. Yet the fact that he nevertheless went on to exert a far-reaching influence on society in the
Federal Republic of Germany is part and parcel of the country's social and intellectual history.(20) His less able counterpart in the Third Reich, Otto Koellreutter,(21) seemed to have
forgotten his former enthusiasm for Nazi ideals. Embittered
and unrepentant, he fought in vain to reinstated. Though he
was barred from the Association of German Teachers of
Public Law, he did become Honorary President of the
Federation of Victims of Denazification. Reinhard Hohn, at
one time an influential SS lawyer, but an outsider on the
Berlin faculty, kept a low profile after 1945 and later founded
a successful "Fiihrungsakademie" in Bad Harzburg. Ernst
Rudolf Huber, probably the most important scholar in the
group apart from Carl Schmitt, was regarded as particularly
problematic because of his 1939 book on constitutional law in
Greater Germany (Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches) .
He returned to university much later, and then only gradually.(22) His monumental study of constitutional history since
1789, seven volumes covering the period up to 1933, also contains the message: No more politics.
There were others who went on to enjoy careers with a
meteoric success impressive enough to parallel the economic
miracle itself. Hermann von Mangold became involved in
regional constitutional law and served as a member of the
Dirk van Laak, Gespriiche in der Sicherheit des Schweigens: Carl Schmitt in
der politischen Geistesgeschichte der fruhen Bundesrepublik, Berlin 1993.
21 Michael Stolle is, Geschichte des offentlichen Rechts in Deutschland 19141945, Munich 1999, Vol.3, passim.
22 Ralf Walkenhaus, Konservatives Staatsdenken: Eine wissenssoziologische
Studie zu Ernst Rudolf Huber, Berlin 1997.
20
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Parliamentary Council; Hans-Peter Ipsen drew up early commentaries on the new Basic Law; Hans-Carl Nipperdey(23)
became President of the Federal Supreme Court and Theodor
Maunz(24) even became Minister of Arts and Culture. The
associations of teachers of civil and penal law, public law
teachers and legal historians regrouped. They could greet one
another with an enigmatic smile, united in silence about the
past. Today, now that we have the opportunity of examining
the post-war correspondence of such figures as Carl Schmitt,
Rudolf Smend, Walter Jellinek, Erik Kaufmann, Friedrich
Giese and others, we find that they did indeed express their
opinions quite clearly in private. Gerhard Leibholz, who
returned from exile, spoke disparagingly in 1950 of what he
called the "National Socialist shadow faculty". Jellinek wrote
at the time that "there are more Nazis among our colleagues
than we in our harmlessness might suspect." (25) Hans Peters,
the only public law specialist in the resistance, who taught
initially in Berlin and later in Cologne, was president of the
Gorres Society. He wrote a letter threatening to resign if any
more "old Nazis" were admitted to the association.
Yet those who really did have nothing to hide did not join
forces in order to make a new start. They had far too little in
common. There were people of all age groups and personality types, some who tried to equate their professional insignificance with political integrity, others who felt they had
escaped a living hell they could not bear to talk about. Still
others took an opportunistic attitude towards the more powerful and more active colleagues who so breezily maintained
that they had written some things in the past that they would

Joachim Ruckert, "H.C.Nipperdey," in: Neue Deutsche Biographie (1999),
Vol. 19, pp. 280-282.
24 Michael Stolleis, Law under the Swastika, Chicago 1998, pp. 185-192.
25 Michael Stolleis (above note 12) pp. 348 ff.
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not write in the present, explaining that it had been, as Max
Frisch put it, "a time of excitement", that they had only been
commenting on prevailing law (Maunz), that they had sprinkled their reservations and subtle warnings between the lines,
and that they had often expressed their misgivings about the
regime off the record. In short, the members of the new faculties gradually reached a mutual accommodation and took the
pragmatic approach of letting sleeping dogs lie,(26) especially
since many colleagues kept their distance from the more sensitive issues and may even have made it clear in private that
they had put their past behind them. Johannes Heckel in
Munich turned to canon law. Theodor Maunz in Freiburg was
allowed to work only in the field of administrative law at
first. Ernst Rudolf Huber turned his attention to constitutional history. Karl Larenz abandoned legal philosophy to make
his name instead in the least political aspect of civil law (BGB;
German Civil Code, law of obligations).(27) Georg Dahm, an
outstanding educator, shifted from penal law to international
law. Many new teaching books and fundamental outlines
proved to be little more than superficially revised re-editions
of works published in the 1930s. As Joachim Ruckert pointed
out in his major survey, this was particularly true of the core
areas of civil law, penal law, legal philosophy and legal history, whereas constitutional law, administrative law and labor
law presented rather more serious problems in terms of continuity.(28)

26 Joachim Ruckert, "Abbau und Aufbau der Rechtswissenschaft nach
1945," in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1995, pp. 1251-1259.
27 Wilhelm Wolf, "Zivilrechtswissenschaft ohne Larenz: Die
Positionierung des Privatrechts zwischen 1945 und 1953," in: Kritische
Vierteljahresschrift fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, 1997, pp. 400425.
28 Ruckert (above note 26).
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III.
If we go back to 1933, defying the seemingly linear course
of history, to examine the situation of German jurisprudence,
we find it difficult enough to obtain statements of any substance relating to individual aspects of legal disciplines, let
alone generalize about a body of several hundred active individuals, a plethora of institutions and countless publications.
Add to that all the problems of self-image and retrospective
self-description. The deeper the waters plumbed by research,
however, the more clearly the picture emerges. On the whole,
it is possible to trace a typical development in attitudes to the
regime. First of all, what we find is an administrative elite,
half-willing, without really knowing what it wants, half-fearful without really knowing how justified its fears will prove,
being drawn into a political avalanche and torn into the abyss
along with it. Whether the confusion of voices was the sound
of triumphal whooping or anguished screaming, is unclear.
This confused, exhilarated yet inhibited early stage lasted
until about mid-1934. After that, it became obvious that the
regime would gain stability. This, depending on one's point of
view, was either a threatening or a reassuring prospect. The
November pogrom of 1938 and the outbreak of war the following year marked, for many, the beginning of a sense of
detachment from the regime, though that sense of detachment would soon be tested by the pressures of war. This
ambivalence held sway until the final days of the regime.
In the summer semester of 1933, jurisprudence regrouped
in a new political climate in which colleagues were dismissed
and NS students given power. Yet the new pattern that was
clearly emerging cannot be described in purely political
terms. Most professors of jurisprudence teaching in 1933
were critics of the republic without being actively anti-constitutional. They envisaged an outwardly and inwardly strong
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state in which a politically neutral civil service
(Berufsbeamtentum)would have no party links. This majority
was, for the most part, affiliated to what might be termed the
center field, but also embracing the Deutsche Staatspartei and
even the Deutschnationale Party. Most of them were bourgeois
and conservative, and were willing to co-operate with the
new regime as long as it was able to produce further achievements and success, willing to temper its persecution of dissenters, and otherwise refrain from upsetting the apple cart.
It was on this sandy soil that the symbiotic relationship
between government and traditional elites, so typical of
National Socialism, was built.
An occupational pattern based, for example, on disciplines or specific areas of jurisprudence, cannot be discerned.
All fields of law were involved to more or less the same
degree, with the exception of those areas in which there was
a particularly high proportion of Jewish scholars, as was the
case in international law, comparative law, international private law and the history of civil law. Indeed, the last if these
had some difficulty in developing any kind of identification,
given that it was explicitly targeted for disparagement by the
NSDAP party program. Nonetheless, even in that area, there
were also specialist representatives who strove to be civil law
specialists and National Socialists (E. Schonbauer).
Age proves a more revealing factor, based on the assumption that the older generation did not waver as readily as the
enthusiastic and ambitious "young wolves" who replaced
them as professors in 1933 (Georg Dahm. Karl Larenz, Franz
Wieacker, Friedrich Schaffstein, Erenst Forsthoff, Theodor
Maunz, Ernst Rudolf Huber et al.). Yet there are exceptions to
this rule in both camps. Some older academics (Conrad
Bornhak, Philipp Heck., Justus W. Hedemann) did try to
jump on the bandwagon, while some younger colleagues
(Ernst Friesenhahn, Hermann Mosler, Wolfgang Kunkel,

14
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Ludwig Raiser) resisted the temptation. Their resistance may
have been based on religious faith, social background or personal character. Whatever their reasons, the sectors typically
regarded as less conducive to National Socialism (working
class, Catholic communities, landed gentry, Wehrmacht officers) do not apply here. At the time, the educated protestant
bourgeoisie (Kulturprotestantismus) dominated university life.
This brings us to the fairly obvious conclusion that professors of jurisprudence were average individuals with average
reactions, and that their connivance with the regime only
casts a dark shadow where ideal and reality met. As the publications indicate, the first wave of enthusiasm, like the first
wave of silence, came in 1933-1935, and was followed by a
period of stabilization in 1935-1938, when power groups
formed within the system. After that came a period of publishing shaped by the war, including a "war effort" in the
field of arts and social science activities organized by Paul
Ritterbusch, rector of Kiel University.(29) Throughout this
period, publishing in the field of jurisprudence typically produced.innumerable publications that typically give little indication of the political climate in which they were written.
These were practice-related specialist publications that concentrated on conveying and commentating upon standard
legislation without actually having to take any political
stance. Indeed, leafing through the legal periodicals of those
years is likely to give the impression that this dry, specialist
approach was prevalent. Of course, this does not apply to the
periodicals founded during the Third Reich with the specific
aim of providing ideological training for lawyers in
"Deutsches Recht", "Deutsche Verwaltung", "Reich-

Frank-Rutger Hausmann, "Deutsche Geisteswissenschaft" im Zweiten
Weltkrieg: Die "Aktion Ritterbusch" (1940-1945), Dresden 1998.
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Volksordnung- Lebensraum". Yet it is interesting to note that
the mood of enthusiasm that emerged between 1933 and 1935
did not swell still further with the outbreak of war. On the
contrary, from 1939 onwards, debates started to become more
objective, occasionally even cautious, accommodating a broad
spectrum of opinion.(30)
If we are to do justice, as it were, to jurisprudence as a
field so closely linked to court and administrative practice
that its scientific character has always been questioned, then
only jurisprudence itself can provide the appropriate yardstick. We must look both to its actively involved apologists
and to those who seek to apply today's standards to its evaluation. The history of the subject must first of all reflect upon
the functions that jurisprudence as a subject, with all its subdivisions, has had to fulfill. Only a small minority of its protagonists pursue the maxims of basic research. Legal theoreticians and legal historians-when they are not delving into
utterly esoteric issues-also have a tendency to attribute contemporary references to their findings. They, too, are dependent upon the political context in the creation of research
hypotheses and in the selection of sources and references as
well as in the presentation of findings.
Essentially, the parallel tasks of research and teaching in
the field of jurisprudence are as follows: (1) Introducing the
next generation to the system of prevailing law; in other
words, conveying legislation in the broadest sense; (2)
Drawing political givens, new legislation and jurisdiction into
a coherent system of dogma. This coherence and clarity help,
on the one hand, to convey standards of legislation for teaching purposes, while, on the other hand, they play an imp or-

30 For the reviews see Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des offentlichen Rechts
(above note 21), Vol.3, pp. 299-311.
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tant role in ensuring that legislation is accepted as reliable
and predictable by those to whom it is addressed; (3)
Adapting the system to changes, real or perceived, in the
political situation. This involves defining and interpreting
changes in state, law and society, as a means of prognosis and
as mediation between political and legislative systems. In the
case of National Socialism, jurisprudence specifically served
the political system by the conventional means of molding
what the political system wanted into authoritative legal doctrine. Legislation, jurisdiction and even academia transformed such violent acts as annulment of citizenship, arrest,
murder and pogroms into "lawful acts". Consider, by way of
example, the law passed following the Rahm murders of June
1934. In a move unparalleled in legal history, this law, consisting of a single sentence, declared the "measures" to be lawful
acts of self-defense on the part of the state. When a respected
leading authority in the field of jurisprudence justified this
law with such conviction as to make it sound inevitable, he
was appealing to his readers to accept the unacceptable.(31)
The Nazi state, which was able to clothe its acts of violence in
the formal standards of the bourgeois state that were based
on the rule of law, had every reason to assume that many citizens who should have known better would accept the form
as content and thereby be persuaded to go along with it.
Thus, the technique of legally seizing power became a legal
assertion and implementation of power. The legal form in
which injustice was clothed made it seem as though a limit
had been set.
Jurisprudence in the years 1933 to 1945 fulfilled the functions described here in various ways. There was a drop in the
number of new lawyers being trained. Whereas there were
31 See the famous article by Carl Schmitt, "Der Fuhrer schutzt das Recht,"
in: Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, 1934, pp. 945-950.
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some 22,000 students of law registered in the summer semester of 1930, that figure had fallen to 4,555 by the summer
semester of 1939. During the war, the numbers declined still
further, reaching barely 3,000 in the winter semester of 1941.
The number of women studying law fell even more dramatically (from 1175 in the summer semester of 1930 to just 42 in
the summer semester of 1938). This trend went so far that
there was talk of closing down some of the smaller faculties
(such as Frankfurt am Main, Marburg and Halle). Whether
the quality of legal training also declined is difficult to say,
but there is little affirmative indication of its decay.
Admittedly, there were certain distractions, in the form of
student" camps" and various obligations connected with the
institutional procedures of the Nazi state, but, on the whole,
the university teaching staff that remained was as highly
qualified as it had been in the days of the Weimar Republic.
The faculties were fairly successful in warding off infiltration
of the staff by party loyalists.
Given the increasingly hectic and uncoordinated lawmaking of the Nazi state, let alone its sheer volume, it was hardly
possible to shape the new legislative material into a coherent
system. As there was no longer any parliamentary discussion
of new legislation, and since new laws were soon being
passed by the ministries, any control at all was now in the
hands of a ministerial bureaucracy that frequently found its
aims thwarted by orders from the various power centers of
the NSDAP. The new legislation took both the public and the
academic world alike by surprise. There could no longer be
any talk of jurisprudence as a shaping force. Even Ernst
Rudolf Huber's enormous endeavor to systematize public law
was clearly an artificial construct that was no longer seen as
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in any way binding.(32) The many legislative proposals
drawn up in the Academy of German Law suffered the same
fate. Even if a few of them did find their way into social law,
penal law, civil procedure or other legal fields, it was not
because of the authority of the academic body, but, at most,
because of their acceptance by the ministerial bureaucracy.
Things look different if we ask what jurisprudence did in
terms of adapting to the new situation created by the Nazi
state. Here, we find a number of effective contributions, such
as the "specific-general concept" (coined by Larenz), the
acceptance of a graduated concept of property and ownership and the abolition of the general section of the Civil Code
(BGB) (Wieacker), the implementation of a new vocabulary
relating to the "Gemeinschaft" or "community" and the corresponding exclusion of those deemed "alien to the community" in labor law (the corporate community), landlord and
tenant law (the household community) and other areas. Carl
Schmitt's remarkable formula "thinking in terms of concrete
order" proved highly successful. It was Carl Schmitt, too,
who, just before Germany launched its campaign of aggressive expansion, introduced the "Grossraum (Greater Space
Theory with prohibition of intervention by foreign powers).
In administrative law, Ernst Forsthoff described local state
benefits as "Daseinsvorsorge" or "existence assurance"-a
well-chosen term borrowed from Jaspers that was not to be
fully accepted until the Federal Republic. In penal law, the
definition of criminal types, "Tiitertypenlehre" (Edmund
Mezger), the inclusion of "characteristics of will" in the facts
of the case (Hans Welzel), and the shift of focus from the
"crime" itself to the "criminal will", helped to bring traditional penal law closer in line with the new political will,

32 Ernst Rudolf Huber, Verfassungsrecht des Grofldeutschen Reiches,
Hamburg 1939.
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placing it more fully in its service. In a similar spirit, jurisprudence addressed such issues as easier divorce proceedings in
the case of childless marriages, forced sterilization, the killing
of the mentally ill, the dismissal of legal protection in "political" cases as a "justizloser Hoheitsakt" (" act of sovereignty bar
justice") and many other specific political issues related to
National Socialism. In this respect, it must unfortunately be
said that jurisprudence fulfilled its core function very well
indeed - fundamentally reflecting the spirit of the times and
implementing such reflection in a wealth of proposals, small
and large. In this, it remained a creative force, with prolific
publication occurring until well into the war years.

IV.
The reluctance to glance in the mirror after 1945, of which
I have already spoken, is hardly surprising, given what we
know about the psychology of memory. Every author writes
"in his time", and every writer feels that his own work is
more coherent and free from influence than it really is. Noone wants to have his life's work declared worthless. These
are understandable attitudes. As Friedrich Nietzsche put it so
succinctly: "'This I have done,' says my memory. 'This I cannot have done,' says my pride and remains intractable. In the
end, memory gives in."(33)
The resulting reluctance of academics to look into their
own academic history after 1945 has been noted and criticized many times. Explanations have been offered, many of
them plausible enough, such as the lack of impartial detachment or an unwillingness to indulge in self historicizing.
There was probably also a sense of shame, for the most part
suppressed but nevertheless subconsciously present, at hav33

Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bose, Viertes Hauptstiick, 68.
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ing succumbed so readily to the spirit of the times. This sense
of shame easily co-exists with an aversion towards those who
were born late enough to feel righteous and who so often
took the moral high ground in expressing their surprise at the
behavior of their elders. It was a gesture of accusation that
not only sealed the lips of the older generation, but proved
academically unproductive, for the oft-repeated talk of the
older generation's alleged failure was a moralist stance that
obscured more than it enlightened. It defined the problem
primarily as a moral one, linking it to a single "misled" generation, and thereby not only avoiding an actual historical
explanation, but also distorting the view of their own conformity and capacity to adapt. That is something the older generation was only too happy to point out to the revolutionary
generation of 1968 at every opportunity.
In fact, the history of jurisprudence in the Federal
Republic has barely been tackled to date. A joint project
undertaken by Dieter Simon, and a broad survey by Joachim
Ruckert clearly did not set anything in motion.(34) This may
have something to do with the continued emphasis on treating the National Socialism complex, together with a reluctance to explore one's own personal lines of continuity. There
may also be a special kind of irritation that tends to be triggered by any historicizing of those subjects in which dogmatic truths are involved.
As a number of new findings have shown, the first
decades of the Federal Republic, at least, have now become
history. Norbert Frei has systematically examined the way the
young republic dealt with its Nazi past, albeit without going
into the history of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, he does touch
34 Dieter Simon (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner RepubZik: Studien zur
Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Jurisprudenz, Frankfurt 1994; Joachim Ruckert
(note 26).
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upon the subject indirectly, in talking of the reconstruction of
the legislative content of Article 131 of the Basic Law regarding the legal relations of persons formerly employed in public
service.(35) University staff, too, were persons who had been
"in public service on 8 May 1945" and who now sought reinstatement at the universities. This process had been concluded by 1950, bar a few exceptions.
The three years between capitulation and currency reform
saw a heated and almost anarchic debate flare up in periodicals and conferences, after which silence ruled. The annual
meetings of the individual specialist disciplines did not take
place again until about 1949. When they did, they did not discuss their own past. Those who had believed in genuine
moral renewal were disappointed to see the public sector filling up again with former NSDAP members. Those who really
did have a guilty past refused to confront the matter. All this
was overshadowed by the Wirtschaftwunder-the economic
miracle-by integration into Western Europe, by the euphoria
of winning the 1954 World Cup and the status that victory
conferred, along with a new-found affluence reflected in holidays abroad and a general mood of eat-drink-and-be-merry.
The furies, it seemed, had been silenced.
Yet a new sense of unrest had been fomenting after 1960.
Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem in 1961, the anti-nuclear movement, an increasingly strong GDR that sought to prove the
continuity of fascist tendencies in the West, Western publications (such as Seeliger's Die Braune Universitiit), the
Auschwitz trial in 1965, and the first series of lectures at
Munich, Tiibingen and Berlin on the Nazi past of the universities(40) created a climate in which any accusation of a Nazi
past had a good chance of being believed. With new cases

35

Frei (above note 11) pp. 69 ff.
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emerging all the time, the younger generation's suspicions
were fuelled. All this, together with the first critical voices
raised against America and emotions fuelled by an underlying generation conflict, created the volatile mixture that
exploded in 1967-1969.
The lawyers, on the whole, responded by withdrawing
into their own closed world. Anyone who admitted their own
"involvement" was likely to be shunned. Such an admission
was infra dignitatem. Those who criticized too strongly or
expressed solidarity with the students were marginalized. For
this reason, many who were eager to establish their careers
avoided the subject of the Nazi past rather than risk clashing
with the leading figures of the faculties. The wheels of legal
history moved slowly. In those days, there was no such thing
as "contemporary legal history". Irrespective of such internal
hindrances, 1968 saw the start of a new direction in scholarly
writing in that field. It was Herbert Jager in 1967 and Bernd
Rlithers in 1968 who first began to explore the subject in any
real depth with their post-doctoral theses. In 1968, the
Institute for Contemporary History also began its major,
albeit flawed, project on German judiciary and National
Socialism.(36) From then on there was a steady stream of
publications, dealing at first with the judiciary, then with the
legislation and administration of National Socialism, and
finally with jurisprudence itself.
At first, the question of criminal wrong, that is to say the
question of guilt, took the fore. It was often linked with calls
for the punishment of Nazi crimes to be pursued more energetically.(37) At the end of the 1970s, there followed a phase
Joachim Ruckert, "Justiz und Nationalsozialismus: Bilanz einer Bilanz,"
in: 50 Jahre Institut fur Zeitgeschichte: Eine Bilanz, Munich 1999, pp. 181 ff.
37 Bernhard Diestelkamp, "Die strafrechtliche Ahndung von NS-Unrecht:
Ein Forschungsbericht," in: Zeitschrift fur Neuere Rechtsgeschichte (1999)
Vol. 21, pp. 417-435.
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of greater emphasis on analyzing the political system as a
whole. By the 1980s, when it carne to writing an encyclopaedia article on Nazi law, I had the impression that interest had
already waned.(38) But this was only a temporary phenomenon, for interest has increased again enormously since then,
and has, as it were, taken off in two directions. On the one
hand there is a continued tendency towards historicizing that
goes hand in hand with a sober analysis of functions and a
willingness to compare systems. On the other hand, there is a
new collective sense of shock when contemplating the
Holocaust. There is also an awareness of a change of generation, international interest in Steven Spielberg's film
Schindler's List, the debate about compensation for slave
laborers, an international neo-Nazi scene and many other factors, possibly including a newly awakened fear of German
unity. Finally, there was and still is a considerable financial
interest in the marketing of publications concerning the terror
of this era.
An interesting example of delayed self awareness is the
way in which the Association of German Public Law Teachers
has so far painstakingly avoided undertaking any form of
analysis of its past. Having reconstituted their association in
1949 with considerable inner conflict and a certain amount of
defiance, they have consistently avoided glancing in the mirror. Only once, on 17 December 1953, when the Federal
Constitutional Court (BVerfG) determined the end of public
employee status on 8 May 1945, sending a cry of dismay
through their ranks, did they turn to the theme of "professional public service and state crises." (39) Needless to say, the
Michael Stolleis, "Nationalsozialistisches Recht," in: Erler et al. (eds.),
Handworterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. III (1984) pp. 873-892.
39 Richard Naumann - Hans Spanner, "Das Berufsbeamtentum und die
Staatskrisen," in: Veroffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen
Staatsrechtslehrer (1955), Vol. 13.
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predominant view was that professional public service had
re-emerged from the state crisis of 1945 and that civil servants
had been greatly wronged by the Federal Constitutional
Court. It was fifty years after the re-founding of the
Association of Public Law Teachers that it was decided that
the subject of their Nazi past should be examined.(40)
The question I put now, by way of conclusion, is aimed at
a theoretical gain. Allow me to outline briefly wherein this
might lie. It all began with the trivial assertion that jurisprudence is a science based on specific responsibilities, actions,
transactions or punishments. Jurisprudence makes statements
of a preparatory, commentating, correcting and systematizing
nature in respect of political, economic and social issues. Its
scientific character is often questioned. It is "involved" in politics in every sense. Only in marginal areas of jurisprudence
(legal history, legal sociology, comparative law, philosophy of
law) is its active role diluted and its scope for "free" scientific
or academic reflection increased - in so far as it is possible at
all to achieve a "disinterested" meta level through the contemplation of social contexts.
Praxis oriented jurisprudence, embedded within the system of co-ordinates of politics and contemporary values, is
part and parcel of social communication and interaction. It
seems unrealistic to demand of it more reflection and unbiased observation of its own past than we expect from society
as a whole. Administrative elites, by definition, have to adapt
to changing circumstances, because otherwise they would not
be able to function.
The processes of adaptation, however, take place at different speeds. The years after 1933 and the period after 1945 difHorst Dreier - Walter Pauly, "Die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre in der Zeit
des Nationalsozialismus," in: Veroffentlichungen (above note 39) 60 (2001)
pp. 9-147, the best survey currently available.

40

RELUCTANCE TO GLANCE IN THE MIRROR

25

fer fundamentally in this respect. After 1933, there were enormous inner tensions, because the traditional image of the
legal profession and the scale of values that prevailed in a
state based on the rule of law came into conflict with a political sea change, one that many bourgeois lawyers, in particular, had welcomed. Bonds between colleagues were torn
apart, and at the same time jobs became available for the next
generation. The type of "moderate" anti-Semitism acceptable
in bourgeois circles was pandered to, albeit at the price of
professional ethics. Political satisfaction and moral shame
continued to coexist. It was only when the final phase of the
war increased their own suffering that the shame was suppressed and forgotten.
After 1945, it was the memory of personal suffering and,
with that, the instinct for survival, that dominated. The legal
profession as a whole, including most of the university faculties, focused on short term goals: physical survival and keeping their families together, "denazification", getting back
their old job or securing a new professorship, building up the
curriculum, drawing up new textbooks, re-founding professional organizations. Psychologically, they concentrated on
defending themselves against accusations, sometimes perhaps even shutting out the feelings of guilt they sensed on
renewing contacts with colleagues who had emigrated.
Politically, they had no problems in detaching themselves
from National Socialism after its collapse; there was a tendency to claim that one had never really been a part of it, that
one had always resisted mentally, and sometimes even in
word and deed. This may have not been entirely mistaken,
but as a general description of the group, neither was it
entirely correct.
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The reluctance to glance in the mirror may be morally
reprehensible, but in retrospect, there is a certain rationality
about it. It served, and still does, as the cement that bonds
groups who are threatened or who feel threatened and who
seek to climb back up the ladder. Too much retrospective or
introspective thinking would appear to be detrimental to an
outward assertiveness. And so, as the saying so aptly goes,
the skeletons were left in the closet, in the hope that the problematic memories would disappear into thin air all by themselves-that time would take care of them (the so-called biological solution), though participants tended to forget that
their own biological solution was nearing and that they
would not be able to tell the following generation what to
think, let alone to seal their lips.
What I find surprising is not so much what the philosopher Hermann Liibbe called the "communicative
silence,"(41) but the fact that it worked so well for so long.
However, there is an explanation for that, too. Small groups,
such as the clergy, business managers or academics have a
tendency to co-opt younger colleagues. In other words, they
push their own disciples through the eye of a needle to make
them part of the system. This makes the up and coming generation extremely dependent on the patronage and good will
of the older generation. In such a situation, breaking the
taboo of mentioning the past can be a risky business. The cartel of silence does not collapse until public pressure on the
older generation increases or until the job market expands
and diversifies to the extent that the profession can no longer
respond homogeneously.
This can be observed in retrospect at the threshold already
mentioned: the period from 1964 to around 1970. Since then,
Hermann Liibbe, "Der Nationalsozialismus im deutschen
NachkriegsbewufStsein," in: Historische Zeitschrift (1983), pp. 579-599.
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we have seen that it is indeed possible to ask questions about
the Nazi past of the legal profession, but at the same time, we
find the answers given superficial and uninteresting as long
as the only aim is to show up the "brown spots" in the spirit
of a denazification process. Today, there are many monographic studies examining individual representatives of
jurisprudence during the National Socialist era (Carl Schmitt,
Ernst Rudolf Huber, Karl August Eckhardt, Erwin Bumke,
Franz Gurtner, Karl Larenz, Theodor Maunz, Otto
Koellreutter, Heinrich Lange, Hermann von Mangoldt, etc.).
Needless to say, these studies do not have all the answers.
They are, without exception, doctoral theses, whose "life and
work" structure tends to be too much for the average doctoral candidate to handle. Yet, no matter how methodical the
approach, and no matter which issues are confronted, the fact
is that studies on the history of jurisprudence did start moving, although they began later (which seems to be fairly typical) than the studies of the matter itself, such as research
focusing on penal law, analysis of jurisdiction in other fields,
or histories of specific institutions (regional courts, Reich
Administrative Court, Supreme Administrative Court, Reich
Ministry of Justice etc.).
Today, there is no succinct and comprehensive history of
science linking the history of mentalities, ideas and institutions. For this reason, we have to form our image from the
histories of private law, constitutional and administrative law
and penal law. One particular area that requires greater scholarly attention is the history of penal law and philosophy of
law.( 42) A history of the history of law would also be a fascinating subject. And in fact there are already two volumes of

42 Sylvie Hiirstel, Neo-Hegelianisme et Philosophie du Droit de la Republique
de Weimar au Troisieme Reich, Paris 1998.
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individual studies on that. (43)
The idea of drawing up a comparative history of twentieth century European jurisprudence would appear to verge
on the impossible, for the project seems to be dogged by
insurmountable obstacles. As far as I am aware, there is no
country that has undertaken a study of the internal development of this profession in the course of the last fifty years - a
study highlighting the key experiences of the generation in
question and linking the immanent changes in academic
debate with shifts within the academy and society. These
studies would have to focus microscopically on individual
figures while at the same time drawing macroscopic structural outlines. What is more, they would have to be written with
moral courage, without fear of the reactions of colleagues or
their students, especially when the insignificant is to be
deemed insignificant. In France, this would mean pointing to
the collaboration with the Vichy regime and, above all, the
many years of (post-Stalinist) Communist involvement by
French intellectuals. Italians would have to confront the ease
with which former Fascists were rehabilitated and take a
closer look at the Italian left, including the Brigate Rosse. The
same applies to other countries that were victims of National
Socialism (Netherlands, Denmark, Norway) or Stalinism
(Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic states) or
those which operated profitably on the margins (Sweden,
Switzerland). That is something that has not happened yet
and is likely to be some time in coming. Just how deep the
wounds are and how profound the self-deception, is evident,
for example, in Ditlev Tamm's major study of Danish collaboMichael Stolleis and Dieter Simon (eds.), Rechtsgeschichte im
Nationalsozialismus, Tubingen 1989; Joachim Ruckert and Dietmar
Willoweit (eds.), Die deutsche Rechtsgeschichte in der NS-Zeit, ihre
Vorgeschichte und Nachwirkungen, Tubingen 1995.
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ration,(44) a work which caused a sensation. The same is true
of the Papon trial in France and the beginning of Swiss and
Swedish studies of their countries' collaboration with the
Nazi state. Yet we are still a long way from an analysis of
jurisprudence, which is not the focal point of such studies.
This is particularly true of states that have only recently freed
themselves from their own forms of Fascism, such as Spain
and Portugal, where the "phase of silence" continues. In the
case of Russia, the difficulties are further compounded by the
fact that there was no sudden changing of the guard in the
faculties of jurisprudence during the transition to the postSoviet era. Instead, it would seem that the current blend of
old and new is a guarantee that no unbiased history of twentieth century jurisprudence is likely to be forthcoming in the
foreseeable future.

44 Ditlev Tamm, Retsopgoret efter Besaettelsen, 2 nd edition, Copenhagen
1985.

